A simple model for analysis of the business environment by Mygind, Niels
 CEES 
 
Working Paper No. 67             September 2007 
 
The PIE-model: Politics – Institutions – Economy  























Center for East European Studies 
Department of International Economics and Management 
 
Copenhagen Business School 
Porcelænshaven 24  
Dk-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark 
Tel + 45 3815 2515    Fax + 45 3815 2500 
The PIE-model: Politics – Institutions – Economy 
- A simple model for analysis of the business environment 
Niels Mygind, CEES/INT, Copenhagen Business School, 1st draft, September 2007 
 
1. Introduction 
Societies all over the world are complex systems of human beings interacting with each other for 
making a living. Understanding these societies is essential for international business whatever the 
company interacts through foreign trade, outsourcing production or foreign direct investments - 
FDI. Choice of location makes it necessary to do an analysis of relevant foreign societies. The exist-
ing models for these analyses are often too simplified, static and without enough emphasis on key 
determinants for these societies – their institutions. The quality of institutions is an import part of 
the explanation for the level of development in different countries (WB 2002, IMF 2005, WEF 
2006); but there is no simple link between institutions and economic performance (Rodrik 2004).   
 
In later years, there have been drastic changes in institutions in many countries. Most markedly this 
happened in the countries in transition from command economies to market oriented democracies in 
Eastern Europe, but also the changes in India and China and other emerging markets are closely 
connected to important institutional changes although implemented in a more gradual manner. The 
institutional development must be analyzed in a holistic model including the dynamic interaction 
with politics and the macroeconomic development. This is neglected in existing models. In interna-
tional business books like Brooks (2004) or strategy textbooks like Johnson and Scholes (2001) the 
analysis of the business environment is based on a PEST-model, or in an extended version as a 
PESTLE-models. This is basically just a checklist with the following elements: Political-, Eco-
nomic-, Socio-economic-, Technological-, Legal-, and Environmental conditions. However, this 
literature does not give a clear definition of the different elements; it does not include the dynamics 
between the elements; and it does not make appropriate emphasis on the role of institutions. 
 
The ambition behind the development of the PIE-model is to get behind the development of institu-
tions. The analysis shall be holistic – so the economic, political, and institutional developments are 
understood in relation to each other and not just listed separately. The interaction between these 
elements must be emphasized and the dynamic perspective must show how the different elements 
influence each other and go into processes of dynamic change of the whole model. At the same time 
the goal is to make a relatively simple overview over the main elements and their interaction. The 
idea is that it can be used for a relatively simple analysis of the framework of a given society.  
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 It is of course not possible to make a correct model of the complex world. There will be a lot of 
simplifications. This concern also the specific definitions of the different parts in the model and the 
problem of where to put different sub-elements which overlaps with different systems, see figure 1. 
This is a first draft, deeper theoretical background and more empirical examples will be added in 
later versions. It must also be stressed that when the PIE-model is applied to a specific analysis the 
different elements must be weighted and adjusted to the specific analysis. In the end of the paper 
more advice is given for customizing the analysis seen in relation to a specific industry and type of 
strategy choices. Specific indicators for measuring different variables are suggested in the appendix. 
  
2. Presentation of the model 
2.1 Overview  
Human beings devise institutions as constraints on human behavior to shape human interaction 
North (1990). The political and economic institutions of a society define the rules of the game be-
tween the citizens in a given society, and high institutional quality is a main driver for growth. This 
is the reason why institutions – both formal and informal – are included as a main system in the 
model of society. The political institutions define the rules for how the political system functions 
through the constitution. The economic institutions set the framework for the rules of the game in 
the economy. The informal institutions laid down in the given culture set the unwritten rules of the 
game both for politics and economy. The change of formal institutions is done through the political 
process – therefore, the arrows go both ways between politics and institutions.  
 
Politics are based on the distribution of power, income and resources on the citizens, who can be 
divided into different social groups in relation to this distribution. Different cultures also play a role 
in relation to different ethnic or religious groupings. This makes a connection between the informal 
institutions and social groups. It may be argued that politics also should include the political institu-
tions – the formal rules for how decisions are made in the political system and some informal insti-
tutions are also closely related to the political process. However, to specify the dynamics between 
the political processes and the changing institutions, the political institutions are taken out sepa-
rately to form an important part of the institutional system. In this way politics and institutions over-
laps considerably. This is also the case for many other elements where e.g. economic policy could 
both be defined as part of institutions on a more applied level, and as part of politics, and in fact 
also as part of the macro economy. Financial systems could be included as a special market under 
economy, but here it will be included as en economic institutions important for the functioning of 
other markets. Thus, a choice must be made to make the model operational – as done in figure 2.  
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Figure 1  Overlapping PIE-Model: Politics – Institutions – Economy  
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Figure 2 – Dynamics of the PIE-Model: Politics – Institutions - Economy 
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The economy is divided in two parts: the flow variables, such as GDP, investments, consumption, 
etc. and the stock variables, such as human resources - size and quality of the workforce - capital 
equipment given in the production structure of enterprises, the technological level imbedded in this 
structure, the infrastructure, and the natural given geography and resources. Flow variables like net 
fixed investments make up the addition to the stock of capital equipments. The economy is strongly 
influenced both by economic institutions – and the economic policy determined in the political 
process. At the same time the economy lays the base for the distribution between different social 
groups. The economic development, the accumulated resources at a certain technological level also 
influences the potential and high quality and enforcement of institutions. Therefore, figure 2 in-
cludes arrows in both directions between the economy and the boxes of politics and institutions.  
 
Finally, is it important to include the influence from the surrounding world on all the three systems: 
International pressure and alliances influence politics. International pressure, benchmarks, and su-
pervision influence institutions. International interaction through trade, FDI and other types of eco-
nomic cooperation has strong influence on the economy. Also here is a feed back effect – like the 
effect on global oil prices from China’s growth. However, the different links in the model have dif-
ferent weights depending on the specific analysis. This will be exemplified in the following. 
 
The processes of change in institutions are often started in the political system by powerful groups 
believing that their situation can be improved by some institutional changes. Politics are the driving 
force for institutional change. At the same time the institutions set the framework for how this po-
litical change process is run. The institutions determine to a high degree the functioning of the 
economy and the dynamics in the economic system are decisive for the living conditions for differ-
ent social groups and thus their political reaction to the economic performance.  
 
The interaction between the three systems makes it clear why the term of path-dependency is im-
portant: The current institutions are the result of earlier developments, at the same time they set the 
rules of the game for future changes. Some groups have an interest of keeping the status quo and if 
they are strong enough their defense of current institutions may be an important barrier for change. 
In other cases social groups interested in change may be strong enough to initiate such changes in 
the institutions which if successful can consolidate their power and push for further changes. The 
dynamic interaction is path-dependent – the initial conditions are decisive when determining the 
next step. The dynamics of the system will be further discussed in the following, but first it is nec-
essary to go deeper into each of the boxes and give some indicators for the different elements. 
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2.2 Some sources of inspiration 
The theoretical foundation is not in the PEST or PESTLE models since they are just checklists of 
keywords without clear definitions and no precision of their interaction and dynamic development. 
The ambition of making an overall picture of understanding of society goes back to the early history 
like Platon’s “The State”. However, here shall not be given a comprehensive discussion of the de-
velopment of different theoretical models of society, the idea is just to give some of the main 
sources that has given inspiration to the PIE-model. This model may also be seen as a second gen-
eration of the dynamic model of society developed in Mygind (1994): Societies in Transition.  
 
The close relation between politics and economy was a key element for the classical economists 
like Smith, Ricardo, Mill and their opponent Marx. Later the neoclassical tradition focused more on 
“pure” economics, but with macroeconomic theory as a base for economic policy. Marx also had 
much focus on institutions and he stressed the social groups/classes as the historical driver of 
change of these institutions. Later the old institutional economist like Veblen followed this tradi-
tion. The new institutional economists also see institutions as key elements for the economic analy-
sis, but they follow a more narrow neoclassical tradition. They analyze institutions as economic 
variables converging to a new equilibrium securing efficient use of the scarce resources. The lead-
ing institutional economist, and Nobel price winner 1993, Douglass C. North can be placed some-
where between the old and new institutional economists (Van de Mortel 2002). The contribution of 
North has been to give more precise meanings to institutions and how they work. He also explains 
institutional change, but has in his later works emphasized the barriers for convergence to efficient 
institutions – the institutional system can get stuck in inefficient institutional setting because of the 
distribution of power (North 1994). However, political processes are not integrated in this work, 
and the relation between politics and institution should be more developed. The idea in the PIE-
model is by specifying the functioning of both the political-, institutional- and economic systems to 
be able to give a more precise analysis of the dynamic interaction between these three systems.  
 
2.2 Politics 
2.2.1 Social groups 
Social groups can be defined in relation to different and to some extent overlapping criteria. An 
important criterion is based on the distribution of resources in the economic system. This corre-
sponds to the traditional Marxist concept of economic classes. The classes are defined in relation to 
their position in production including their ownership or lack of ownership to economic resources. 
The political game between different social groups around the distribution is a main driver for the 
dynamics of the system. There is link between ownership to economic resources and political 
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power. Groups controlling essential resources are within given institutional constraints able to con-
vert their economic power position to high influence in politics. This is often the case for groups 
with important capital resources. However, although the groups of workers have no capital owner-
ship, they may gain political strength through unions and political parties. If there are democratic 
political institutions and if the workers are well organized, their high number may give them a 
strong position at democratic elections or through the threats of strikes. 
 
The main social groups defined from their interest in relation to employment and ownership of re-
sources are: farmers and agricultural workers; workers in manufacturing/services; small independ-
ent entrepreneurs; white collar workers in private sector/public sector; owners and managers of 
large enterprises; top bureaucrats, political elite, unemployed and people outside the labor market. 
Note, however, that the relevance and definition of different groups changes over history. Indicators 
of social groups can be based on distribution of employment on different sectors, the distribution of 
income and wealth, educational level etc.  
 
The formation and importance of different social groups is closely related to both institutions and 
economy. The technological development determines to a high degree the number of workers in 
different industries. Many years of high growth in productivity in agriculture in developed econo-
mies meant that farmers and agricultural workers, who some centuries ago were the big majority of 
the population, now make up only a small fraction. The relative fall of manufacturing in later years 
means that the group of blue collar workers has lost importance while wage earners in IT, commu-
nication, public administration, health and education and other services have increased in numbers. 
The development of different groups and the distribution of income are closely related to economic 
development. The specific institutions for taxation, for regulation of the labor market, the develop-
ment and regulation of education are important factors behind the distribution.   
 
There are also strong connections to the informal institutions – some groups are defined from ethnic 
and cultural divisions often with overlaps to the social economic background. In countries like In-
dia, Turkey, or Bulgaria there are specific political parties organizing special religious groups.  
 
2.2.2 Political processes - politics 
The social groups and the political processes have been placed in the same box because of the close 
relationship. Conflicts, alliances and developments in relative strength of the different groups – the 
development in their organizational strength – go directly into the political processes. In some coun-
tries like in Scandinavia unions and parties representing the workers have for a century had a strong 
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position and dominated governments for long periods. In other countries like in Latin America con-
servative parties based on landlords have dominated politics for many years. Complex dynamics 
from technological development, institutional changes, and international pressures influence the 
power structure in politics and new groups may take dominant political positions. These political 
changes are important to follow because they determine future changes in institutions, economic 
policies, and thus the development in the economy.  
 
Based on the political institutions and the way the political processes actually functions there can be 
defined a broad specter of different political systems from highly centralized authoritarian regimes 
to broad based democracies with strong political competition between different groups. To what 
degree are the different interests of different social groups in fact represented in the government? 
How much influence do those groups not participating in government have on political decisions? Is 
there a strong opposition which can challenge the current government and develop relevant alterna-
tives for the solution of important problems? This can be measured as the degree of political compe-
tition – increasing with more veto point for different groups in the political process. The more po-
litical competition - the more the current government has to negotiate with opposing groups and 
make compromises. In an overview of the first ten years of transition the World Bank (2002) found 
that those East European countries with most political competition had also most progress in eco-
nomic reforms. It may be argued that a stronger government with a less powerful opposition may be 
more stable and able to make deeper changes. Probably this was the case for some of the develop-
ment in East Asia including the reform process in countries like Singapore and China. It is not given 
that the experience from Eastern Europe can be transferred to other institutional including other 
cultural settings. The dynamic processes change with different conditions in the three systems.  
 
The role of the media is an important part of this process. Are the media independent from the gov-
ernment and do they put forward relevant criticism of the political decisions? Is the political process 
made transparent so the channels of influence of different groups and distributional consequences of 
given policies are made public? These processes are important for balancing different interests in a 
dynamic setting with changing technologies, international relations and changing institutions. De-
mocracies with high political competition may have an advantage, though the political decision 
process may be slow and complicated. If the different interests are not balanced in the political 
process the result may be more abrupt changes in policies and less stability in the long run. This 
means higher political risk seen from the point of view of foreign business partners. 
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The political processes must be seen in close connection to the development in the political institu-
tions. The institutions are changed through politics and at the same time institutional changes can 
imply important changes in the actual political power structure. The rule of the game for politics is 
defined by the political institutions. This includes also the possibilities for organization of different 
social groups in unions, political parties etc. The democratic revolutions in USA and Western 
Europe some hundreds years ago came after drastic changes in the power structure often through 
violent takeovers and were accompanied by the introduction of democratic constitutions. The transi-
tion in Eastern Europe was initiated by gradual political changes in the Soviet Union opening up for 
deep political changes in the Soviet dominated countries starting with Poland and Hungary. Here, 
followed a change in the political institutions and a further change in the political power structure 
with a strong backslash effect ending up in the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Mygind 1994).  
 
2.3  Institutions 
2.3.1 The quality and enforcement of institutions 
According to North (1990) institutions are any form of constraints that human beings devise to 
shape human interaction. Institutions bring structure into human interaction and thus decrease un-
certainty. This is done by defining the rules for the distribution of power and how processes shall be 
run in the political system, how property rights are protected and distributed in the economy, how 
criminal codes are defined and enforced etc. The formal rules function side by side with the infor-
mal or the unwritten rules. These informal institutions work not only within families and closer 
groups, but also within relations to colleagues at the workplace, in relation to business partners etc. 
Informal rules regulate what is the appropriate behavior in situations not covered by formal rules. 
When these rules function the reactions and behavior of the different agents become more predict-
able, uncertainty decreases and coordination becomes easier. Thus, transactions costs are lowered 
and business-relations and market processes function more smoothly (Williamson 1985). In a sys-
tem with high quality institutions it is easier and less costly to make transactions and thus securing 
higher efficiency in the interaction and cooperation between human beings.  
 
It must be noted that there are some often implicit values behind measuring the quality of institu-
tions – values that may change over time and vary with different cultures: Democracy with political 
equality is preferred to authoritarian systems, equality for the law is preferred to different forms of 
favoritism, systems that motivate entrepreneurship and innovation and thus competition and eco-
nomic growth is rated high, while economic equality may not go into the different benchmarks. 
Thus, political judgments are included. There is no objective definition of the best set of institu-
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tions. A given set of institutions lead to a certain outcome in the economic system with a certain 
distribution between social groups. Different groups may thus prefer different sets of institutions. 
 
The quality of formal institutions is relative to the given culture and given natural and technological 
conditions. Some formal institutions may work well in a given cultural setting and be a failure in 
other settings – e.g. some kind of state regulation may work much better in a society based on a 
high degree of collective values compared to a more individualistic oriented society.  
 
When evaluating the quality of the formal institutions it is important not only to look at the rules as 
such – the letter of the law – but to include to what extent the rules are actually enforced – the prac-
tical implementation of the law. Effective enforcement is necessary to for high institutional quality. 
The experience from transition countries shows that it may be easy to pass nice legislation, but dif-
ficult to make the administration and court system function to effectively enforce this legislation. 
Long traditions of personal networks, favors to family and friends and other types of corruption 
with roots in the culture may be difficult to change and makes enforcement relatively weak. 
 
The changes of institutions depend on the power of different social groups and the political proc-
esses. Closely related to this is also economic and technological development. In addition the in-
formal institutions play an important role with most cultural values changing only slowly over time. 
Thus, institutions vary much between different societies, and it comes as a package with a certain fit 
between the formal and the informal institutions.  
 
Still, some institutions turn to be more efficient in terms of developing business and economic 
growth and from this observation there have been developed different measuring sticks for the qual-
ity of institutions. Political institutions may be measured in relation to how they guarantee human 
rights and economic institutions in the ease of doing business. It is a difficult task to make these 
measures. An often used method is to make a poll by asking a group of experts in the field about 
their perception of the quality of institutions in certain areas in a given country. This is the case for 
most of indicators used by World Economic Forum (WEF 2006) and World Bank – “doing busi-
ness”. Another method is to survey a high number of firms on the different barriers business activi-
ties in their country. See the World Bank “enterprise survey”. In the World Bank governance index 
Kaufman et al. (2006) have made a mesa-study by combining a number of different studies. They 
include the highest correlated results and exclude outliers. The indicators give a clear indication of 
quality measured in relation to democracy, equal rights, and equality before the law. Their six 6 
aggregated governance indicators and some indicators from other sources are given in the appendix. 
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 2.3.2  Political institutions: 
The formal rules of the political game are given in the national constitution. It defines the rules for 
the political process including the formal power division between government, parliament, and ju-
diciary with checks and balances to avoid abuse of power. Is it a democracy where the political 
leaders are accountable to the majority of the population or a one party system like in China? Is it a 
system with a strong president like in US or Russia or a parliamentary system like in most of West-
ern Europe? How are elections organized: by proportionality or election in single constituencies like 
in UK? Is there a high threshold for party representation like 7% in Russia? Is power concentrated 
in the center or is much power given to regions and municipalities? What are the guarantees for 
human rights of speech, voting and association? Does the ruling government take strong positions 
in the media or are there good possibilities for the media and the opposition to make transparency 
around abuses of power?  
 
2.3.3  Enforcement – rule of law – part of both political and economic institutions 
The constitution defines the role of the state administration and the judiciary of implementing and 
enforcing the law. In this respect these organizations are part of the political institutions. They en-
force human rights and other political institutions defined in the constitution. If the court system is 
not impartial, nicely defined human rights may not be enforced in practice. In this way the quality 
of the actual enforcement is an important part of the institutional quality. The state administration 
and the judiciary are the organizations implementing the formal rules not only the political, but the 
economic institutions as well. Therefore, the quality of these organizations, the administrative ca-
pacity of the state and the ability of the court system to impartially enforce the letter of the law de-
termines the actual implementation of the formal institutions. Is there a rule of law – so the individ-
ual entities are treated equally in relation to the rules and the implementation of legislation?  
 
To what degree does corruption distort the functioning of the system and the rule of law? When 
personal networks, favoritism takes over instead of formal rules, the informal institutions are domi-
nating. In this way there may be important unwritten rules for the behavior of state administration 
and judiciary. These rules will be much less transparent especially for foreigners not having access 
to the relevant networks and not knowing the local traditions. In this way there will not be rule of 
law and uncertainty and transaction cost will increase for most players. 
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2.3.4  Economic institutions 
The economic institutions cover the rules governing the economy. This includes rules for property 
rights over the resources – the distribution of ownership rights to control and rights to get the sur-
plus from production. These rights are closely connected to the institutions for corporate govern-
ance. The economic institutions also include the rules for the distribution of rights between the state 
and individual entities – the degree of state regulation versus liberalization. Finally, it sets the insti-
tutional framework for economic policy including rules for the central bank and the regulation of 
the financial sector. The financial sector itself is also included as an institution since it functions as 
leverage for other markets in the economic system.  
 
The economic institutions of property rights distinguished the former command economies with 
state ownership from market economies with decentralized private ownership rights. In a market 
system economic institutions protect property rights both against appropriation by the state and 
against other private entities threatening these rights with illegal means. Clear property rights are 
important for making trading of goods and services possible and for creating a market for control of 
enterprises as well as for land and other assets. Bankruptcy legislation is necessary for securing 
creditors’ rights and the development of the financial system. More specific rules are implemented 
in company law, rules for company auditing and disclosure, and for the organization of corporate 
governance. There are quite different models of corporate governance in different developed West-
ern economies. The market based Anglo-American model with a strong role for the stock market, 
the bank based model in Germany and Japan with a high degree of bank ownership and control with 
companies, and the continental European blockholder model with highly concentrated ownership 
(Denis and McConnell 2003). The identity of the dominating owners is of high importance for cor-
porate governance and the role of the owners in the economy. 
 
The financial sector can be more or less directly owned and regulated by the state. The main role is 
to channel funds from households and companies with surplus of savings to entities in need of 
funds. Main indicators are: domestic credit to the private households and enterprises in percentage 
of GDP and non performing loans in total loans.  
 
The market orientation of the economy versus state regulation can be measured as the degree of 
liberalization in different areas, such as the degree of price liberalization, the degree of regulation in 
relation to setting up new businesses, the openness of foreign trade, FDI and other capital flows. 
The tax system can on the one hand be taken as a barrier to business. On the other side a well-
functioning public sector may help to stabilize and develop the economic system. Strict rules for 
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competition and some regulation of monopolies may secure free entry. In the labor market, the state 
may play an important role for training, social safety net and securing flexibility. Also health, edu-
cation and research may weight heavily on public expenditures. The developed market economies 
have quite different types and degrees of state involvement. In the US model public expenditures 
make up a relatively small proportion of GDP while it is high in the Scandinavian economies. Most 
indicators take high taxes as negative; but do this mean low institutional quality in Scandinavia?  
 
2.3.5  Informal institutions – Culture 
The informal institutions are even more difficult to classify than the formal. The unwritten rules are 
transferred from one generation to the next by socialization, and for foreigners it may be impossible 
or take many years to learn these rules. The informal institutions can be categorized in different 
levels from deep beliefs about fundamental questions about life and death - often closely connected 
with religion - to norms and preferences covering daily life. The values on the most superficial level 
can change rather fast following often short lived fashion trends, but deep beliefs change in most 
cases rather slowly. Williamson (2000) assumes that the basic informal institutions change within a 
time horizon of more than 100 years, while formal institutions can be changed much faster. After 
the transitions in Eastern Europe it is remarkable how the church has reappeared in many peoples 
daily life. However, these deep values have been quite strong all the time and only reappeared on 
the surface when the repression of religion was abandoned. On the other hand many of the routines 
of hoarding goods because of deficits in the shops disappeared when prices were liberalized and the 
shops filled with goods, though at much higher prices. The routines of neglecting customers have 
taken a bit longer to change, but still remarkable changes happened within quite few years.  
 
It is a common myth that East Europeans because of the low motivation and lack of competitive 
pressure in the command economies developed a culture of high risk aversion and this would mean 
a low element of entrepreneurship in the new market economy. However, an early study (Shiller et 
al. 1992) showed that the basic attitudes to risk were the same as in Western Europe, but because 
institutions were less developed and the situation were much more uncertain people were reluctant 
to start up new ventures. 
 
An important part of the informal institutions is the degree of social thrust in the society. Do you 
expect your neighbor, your employees, and your business partner to use all possibilities and loop-
holes in contracts to cheat you? Then you need very detailed and complex contracts and insurance 
systems before you go into transactions with them. Or do you in general expect your fellow citizen 
to follow strong moral rules and work for the mutual benefits when going into cooperation? In the 
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last case there is a high level of social thrust. This means low transaction costs and easier conditions 
for doing business for mutual benefits. Social thrust is often connected to homogenous cultures, 
personal networks, and may cause special problems for cross cultural transactions. Social thrust 
may be depleted in situations of drastic political and institutional change with high uncertainty 
about the rules of the game – in relation to the transitions in e.g. Russia you may argue that there 
was a moral vacuum in the years following the revolutionary changes (Mygind 1994). 
 
It is very difficult to categorize and to develop indicators for informal institutions. The most well 
known attempt was done by Hofstede (1983) comparing the attitudes a high number of IBM em-
ployees in 40 different countries all over the world. Based on this study he categorized cultural atti-
tudes in four dimensions: collectivism/individualism; high/low power distance; masculin-
ity/femininity; and high/low uncertainty avoidance. In a later work Hofstede (1988) added: 
long/short term orientation. The indicators have caused much debate about the general validity of 
these categories – a debate not to be followed further here. 
 
2.4 Economy 
2.4.1  Economic flows, economic policy, markets  
The economic system includes both the flows of production and income and the stocks of accumu-
lated resources. Economic policy is also part of the economic system although it also includes ele-
ments of both politics and of economic institutions - a change in tax structure can both be under-
stood as a change of the economic institutions as well as part of fiscal policy. Economic policy di-
rected toward macroeconomic stabilization is included in the economic system while more struc-
tural policies like labor market policies defining the rules of the game on the labor markets are in-
cluded in the economic institutions. However, there is a floating borderline which shows the close 
relation between the rules of the game, the actual policies and the results on economic variables. 
 
The functioning of the economy and the results on flows such as GDP is determined in a complex 
interaction between economic institutions, culture, economic policies and resources. The economic 
institutions determine a set of incentives which influence the behavior of the agents in the economy. 
Their behavior is also strongly influenced by the informal institutions and the actual preferences 
they have build into their mental model of what they think is good and bad. Thus, the same set of 
formal institutions may influence people with different cultures quite differently. This can be the 
case both in relation to work effort, willingness to take a risk, consumption, savings patterns etc. 
Thus the formal and informal institutions are complementary – and functions as a package.  
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The quality of the formal institutions including their fit to the informal institutions - culture, drives 
the behavior and the performance of the economy. Bad working institutions make high transaction 
costs, low incentives for starting new production and for improving current enterprises. Thus, eco-
nomic performance is closely connected to the quality of institutions lowering uncertainty and 
transaction costs and increasing the incentives for innovation and high effort. Economic policy play 
an intermediary role in this respect since a certain level of macro economic stability is necessary to 
promote business activity. High inflation means high uncertainty and thus lower investments and 
innovation. High unemployment indicates that the current resources are not used efficiently and 
changes in economic policy and/or economic institutions are needed. High trade and current ac-
count deficits may also be a warning for necessary strengthening of economic policy.  
 
There is a close link between growth and economic resources. The quality of these resources deter-
mines their productive potential. When a country makes high investment in developing human capi-
tal and in fixed capital of enterprises and infrastructure it increases the potential for future growth. 
The actual returns on the accumulated resources depend on the quality of the institutions. The stag-
nating growth and crisis in the Soviet command economy in the 1980s is an illustrative example: 
The investment rate was very high, but the institutional setting of the command economy did not 
give the right incentive to allocate and exploit the investments efficiently. The result was steeply 
falling returns on the invested capital leading to a steep fall in growth rates (Mygind 1994).   
 
A specific part of the economic system is the development in different markets at sector and indus-
try level. This includes structural changes of production. The conditions for the development of a 
certain industry are given by the economic institutions. The degree of liberalization: licensing and 
other entry barriers for starting new firms, openness for foreign competition, taxation, rules and 
implementation of competition etc. are important for the competitive pressure on companies, which 
may lead to upgrading of product quality and improved global competitiveness (Porter 1990).  
 
The macroeconomic development is to a high degree reflected in the development of different mar-
kets. However, there may be important differences between different industries dependent on spe-
cific political and institutional conditions - industries competing internationally are more dependent 
on the degree of openness, the construction sector more dependent on the development in the inter-
est rate, the IT sector rely heavily on the educational development etc. This means that it is often 
relevant both to make a PIE analysis at the macro level and at the industry level, see section 4. 
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2.4.2  Economy – resources  
Though some of the resources in a country are given by nature, normally most of them are created 
assets build through the flow of investments over a longer period. In this way there is a close con-
nection between the flows and the stocks in the economic system.  
 
The human capital is the main resource in most countries, however with big variation in size, com-
position and quality. The prospects for the size and growth of the population at least in the short 
term are quite easy to predict. In the longer run it varies with birth rate and lifetime expectancy - 
both sensitive to the level of income. From this the potential labor-force in certain age groups – e.g. 
15-64 years - can be deducted. The proportion of the young and the old part of the population out-
side the working age group gives the so called dependency rate. This rate is increasing when a 
population turns older as it has been the case for all developed countries. However, with increasing 
average income and life expectancy there may a tendency also for prolonging working life, so the 
dependency rate should be corrected for this. 
 
The participation rate also vary between countries with different income levels and different cul-
tures e.g. in relation to participation of women on the labor market. Together, these numbers lead to 
a measure for the total active labor force. Still, the quality of the labor force measured by the educa-
tional level is important for estimating the income potential. This is often measured from the par-
ticipation rates on primary, (basis school), secondary (high school) and tertiary education (univer-
sity level) education – although the quality of educational levels varies, these numbers give a rough 
estimate of the quality of the work force. The level of education and the general health and life-
expectancy of the population is directly related to the quality of the educational and the health sys-
tems. Both systems may be best measured from their outputs in the educational level of the popula-
tion as well as by health indicators such as life-expectancy. However, the number of university-
teachers, the number of medical doctors per capita etc. may also be used as indicators. 
 
Another very important resource is the fixed capital in enterprises. This concerns both the volume, 
the structure on small and large firms and on different industries, and first of all the quality both as 
the technological level and the appropriate fit to current market demand. It is difficult to give a cor-
rect measure for this. A market measure like the stock market capitalization can be used for some 
enterprises, but in most countries the listed companies makes up only a small proportion of all en-
terprises and of total production. Often the flow of production is used as the best estimate of the 
potential. This also concerns the structure of industries. It is important to see the structure in relation 
to the value on the market. Take. the value of the old Soviet industry after jumping into the market 
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in the start of the 1990s. Many of these enterprises turned out to be nearly worthless, because the 
products and production methods did not fit to the new cost- and demand structure after the change 
from plan-bureaucracy-driven to costumer driven demand. The result was a steep fall in production 
(Mygind 1994 and 2007) which came as a surprise not only for the population, but also for most 
economists. To estimate the value of the productive capital it must be considered to what degree it 
has been adjusted, restructured, to the demands of the market. A long period of protection followed 
by liberalization may reveal a lot of unprofitable equipment in high need of restructuring. At the 
same time such liberalization may open up for many new investment opportunities.  
 
There is a close connection between the economic institutions and the incentives to build up a com-
petitive production structure. This covers also the incentive for entrepreneurship and innovation. 
Indicators for the quality of the production structure may be measured by the added value in the 
goods produced by these enterprises, but also measures of high tech content in production can be 
used as an indicator, but there is often much uncertainty in these measures. Production of e.g. mo-
bile phones may count as high tech production, but if the given country only makes assembly done 
by low wage unskilled workers, this categorization may be misleading. Flows like research and de-
velopment in percentage of production or the number of new patents may also be relevant measures. 
 
Where well developed institutions were the regulatory condition for low transaction cost, a well 
developed infrastructure is the condition for low transport and information costs. The infrastructure 
is an important part of a country’s resources. Developed transport and communication structures 
mean that people, goods, services and information can flow around within the country and to the 
outside world at relatively low costs. This is important not only for costs, but also for the develop-
ment of competition. The infrastructure is closely connected to the geography given by nature. It is 
much more expensive to build highways in the mountains than in the lowlands, and easy access to 
the sea contributes to foreign trade (Sachs 2003). In general, the conditions given by nature are very 
important for a country’s resources. This concern: location related to other countries; the conditions 
for developing the infrastructure; raw materials extractable from the underground; and the climate 
and land conditions opening up for different types of agriculture; forestry and energy production 
(wind, water, sun). The exploitation of the potential of nature and the possibility for overcoming 
geographical barriers depend on the technological opportunities. A change in technology like the 
development in telecomm and IT has opened up for new opportunities in quite remote areas.  
 
Finally, it is important when measuring the resources to include the human destruction and deple-
tion of natural resources. Oil-production leads to a fall in the oil reserves and thus may not make a 
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country richer in the long run. At the same time the production and consumption of a given com-
modity may lead to pollution and destruction of nature. This results in a fall in the value of this na-
ture and the income and living conditions it can give future generations. This means that some kinds 
of production which today is measured as an increase of GDP in reality means a fall measured by a 
broader based GDP which includes the destructive effects on the environment.  
 
2.5  Surrounding world 
The surrounding world has not been included as a separate box in the model in line with the PIE-
systems, because the impacts from the outside world can be included in the analysis of each of the 
three sub-systems. Still it is worth mentioning some main interactions with the surrounding world: 
 
International relations and political developments in other countries are important for the actual 
problems and the political agenda in a given country. International organizations, security issues, 
conflicts and alliances with other countries etc. have a direct effect on national politics. Different 
social groups may go into different alliances with groups in other countries. 
 
The change in political and economic institutions is often inspired by other countries. Different 
kinds of international organizations may have direct influence not only by setting benchmarks e.g. 
in human rights questions, but often countries go into international alliances and agreements that 
bring direct change in their institutions. The development in regional cooperation - most developed 
in EU, but also in other regional organizations like NAFTA, MERCOSUR or ASEAN - means that 
the member countries have to adjust many of their institutions to common rules. This is also the 
case for membership of the WTO. Organization like IMF and the World Bank often in their role as 
demanding creditors may also make strong pressure on countries both in relation to development of 
their institutions and on economic policies. 
 
The national economy cannot be separated from the international economic development. Foreign 
trade, capital flows, FDI and other forms of economic cooperation make the foreign dimension an 
important part of economic policy and successful foreign economic relations contribute to economic 
growth. Foreign trade and FDI are important indicators for these relations. The development in FDI 
and portfolio investments can itself be used as indicators measuring foreign investors’ expectations 
to the economic development and their estimates of the quality of institutions (Bevan et al. 2004)  
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3. The dynamics 
The dynamics of the model lie as well within the three subsystems as in the interaction between the 
systems and in relation to the surrounding world. The dynamics within the subsystems are mainly 
from social groups to political process in the political system; between the economic and political 
institutions and between the formal and informal institutions in the institutional system; and be-
tween macroeconomic flows and resources in the economic system. Even within the different parts 
like in economic policy, or in the package of economic institutions there are important dynamics 
and complementarities, where a change in one part induces a change in the other. In this section the 
focus will be on the overall dynamics between the three systems some of which can be illustrated 
by virtuous and vicious circles of development. I must be emphasized that the specific dynamics 
and weight and direction of the causalities depend on the specific conditions in the given society: 
 
Dynamic development can come from several sources, but in many cases the initial process may 
start a chain of changes where it may be difficult to distinguish what comes first - the chicken or the 
egg. Technical developments in the economic system may change the economic performance and 
have effects on income and living conditions for several social groups. This may trigger political 
change and then changes in institutions accommodating further technological change. The devel-
opment around the early industrialization, the democratic revolutions and the liberalization of the 
Western economies is the classical case. For IMF (2005) the history of industrial development of 
USA and Western Europe is closely connected to the constitutional revolutions introducing democ-
racy in USA 1789 and most of Western Europe around 1848. This change in political institutions 
was followed by reforms of economic institutions securing property rights and rule of law leveling 
the playing field and opening up for entry of new firms resulting in intensified competition.  
 
This process made the base for the Western advantage in contrast to the economic development in 
Eastern Europe, Latin America, and China who got caught in a vicious circle of poor institutions 
and lagging economic performance. The political elites had quite unconstrained power and used 
their position to extract rents and restrict entry and competition which could challenge their position 
and wealth. Such a process may result in a negative circle of stagnation where some privileged 
groups monopolize political power, conserve outdated institutions to consolidate their position, and 
suppress social groups who challenge their power. This may lead to low efficiency in the economic 
system, but can be reproduced because of access to a constant flow of easy accessible natural re-
sources like oil. IMF (2005) finds that countries with large natural resources tend to have fewer 
institutional transitions because rent extraction by elites work as a strong barrier for change. 
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The development in IT-telecommunication, transportation etc. has been an important trigger for the 
current globalization process with political changes toward more international orientation, more 
open economic institutions, global competition and increasing international economic integration.  
 
Important initial changes may also occur in the informal institutions. Take the early development of 
Christianity or Islam which was an important part of the political processes and power games in the 
centuries after the collapse of the Roman Empire. Still the egg and hen modification is relevant: 
change of formal institutions and technological changes were also interacting in these processes. 
Change in attitudes like the national awakenings in the late 18th and in the 19th century also played 
an important role behind the democratic revolutions in USA and Europe. 
 
A virtuous circle – a positive self-enforcing circle – can occur if demands from social groups lead to 
political changes, which again drives institutional reform. If these changes are successful they im-
prove the incentives and functioning of the economic system. This may satisfy the demands of im-
portant social groups and consolidate the power of the reform oriented politicians who then can 
make further reforms and institutional changes. The gradual market oriented reform process in 
China has to a high degree followed such a virtuous circle (Mygind 2007b). 
 
These circles go mainly clockwise in figure 2, but there are also interactions with the opposite cau-
sality – e.g. when some political processes lead to a change in political institutions which again 
changes the power-structure supporting further political change. An illustrative case is the devel-
opment in the Soviet Union when Gorbatjov’s gradual democratization led to a strengthening of the 
reform wing - including the election of Jeltsin as the leader in Russia (Mygind 1994, chapter 7)   
 
The development in the Western market economies and the recent development of transition in 
Eastern Europe are cases where the political institutions change before the economic institutions. 
However, in East Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore market orientation 
and industrial take off happened in a period dominated by authoritarian regimes. After some years 
of high growth there was a change in political institutions with development of democratic systems. 
This example shows that the dynamic forces may be different depending on the conditions in the 
different systems. Thus it may be argued that special Asian cultures with high respect for authori-
ties, long time-horizon with a very high savings rate played an important role in this process. An 
interesting question in this content is whether the development in China will follow the same pat-
tern of democratization when the income reaches a certain level for a broad part of the population?  
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4.  Use of the PIE-model 
The PIE-model is mainly made for analysis at the level of society. However, such a macro analysis 
can be supplemented with a more industry specific analysis related to the demands of a firm wish-
ing to investigate the potential in a specific industry. Such industry analysis may include other in-
dustry related tools like Porter’s Diamond (Porter 1990) for analyzing the competitiveness of a 
given industry or Porter’s Five Forces (Porter 1980) for analyzing entry into a given industry. The 
PIE analysis could be done in two rounds: first at the macro- and then at the industry level, or the 
macro analysis could have subsections for more detailed industry-level analysis. In the macro PIE 
analysis you analyze e.g.: general wage-level, general market volume, exchange rate, etc. In the 
industry level PIE you analyze: specific political initiatives and risks in relation to the specific in-
dustry, the role of competitors in relation to the political system. At the institutional level specific 
health and safety regulations or trade barriers for this industry may be relevant to analyze. In the 
economic system you may analyze specific industry developments of wages, availability of labor 
with the necessary qualification etc. A deeper analysis of competitors may also be included. 
 
The weight between the different elements of both the macro and the industry analysis also depends 
on the strategy of the company. If the focus is to offshore production or use cheap factors in the host 
country, the focus will be on elements such as wage development, the quality of labor, or exchange 
rate developments - still these factors must be seen in the political and institutional context. A long 
run FDI decision to develop e.g. the pharmaceutical market in a given country with location of pro-
duction in this market makes it necessary to estimate the long run trends, opportunities and threats 
both at the level of society and at the industry level. Thus, the overall PIE analysis must focus on 
long run market potential, long term political stability, long run institutional trends, long term de-
velopment in wages and purchasing power. The industry-focused analysis will focus on legislation 
in relation to drugs, IPR, and political development that may change this legislation, labor supply, 
education in medicine, etc. The quality of the infrastructure will play an important role for the exact 
location. The industry analysis may focus on other players both existing and potential new entrants. 
 
The time horizon of the analysis depend on the specific purpose - an export decision without bind-
ing contracts into the future may be based on developments within a rather short time horizon, 
while FDI decisions usually point several years into the future. Note, however, that especially the 
institutional indicators are more stable than macroeconomic variables and therefore the PIE-analysis 
is best fit for longer trends.  
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Appendix – list of main indicators and some sources (preliminary - to be extended) 
The intension behind this list is to give some ideas of variables that may be included in the analysis 
and to list some sources and types of available indicators. A specific country analysis shall also in-





• Employment in different sectors, 
• Income distribution, before/after taxes and transfer incomes 
• Wealth distribution 
• Age distribution 
• Distribution on ethnic groups 
It is important to try to track the dynamics in strength, conflicts and alliances, and to specify the 
relation to the development in the economic system. 
Possible sources: WDI-online, OECD (both through CBS library), National statistical offices 
 
Political processes - politics 
• Size of main parties represented in parliament and their relation to social groups. Parties 
may be defined on several dimensions: left-right scales in relation to liberalized markets 
versus state regulation; nationalism versus international openness; secular versus religious. 
• Current government  
• Other important organizations if relevant, e.g. unions, religious organizations, 
• The role and possibilities for the opposition, the role of the media 
• Upcoming elections, possible shifts in power 
Possible sources: EIU country surveys, EIU profiles (CBS Library),  overviews in Freedom House  
 
The political processes are very complex and it is extremely difficult to boil this down to simple 
indicators. However, political scientists make different categorizations, and political risk estimates 
are made to help international business in their location decisions. Indicators may include: 
• Political stability and absence of violence - risk of government destabilized or overthrown 
by unconstitutional or violent means. (World Bank governance index, Kaufman et al. 2006).   
• The degree of political competition – to what extents can the ruling government be chal-
lenged by a strong opposition, number of veto-points (World Bank 2001) 
• Freedom House, freedom of the press: including legal-, political-, and economic environ-
ment (including ownership). 
 
It will often be necessary to give a short historical background for the current political situation to 
understand further dynamics. 
  
The analysis must be seen in close relation to the political institutions. 
 
The analysis could lead to different political scenarios within the relevant time horizon. This in-
clude an estimate of the political risk in relation to the (industry, company strategy etc.) – the risk 




Political  Institutions 
• constitution defining formal power division: president, parliament, judiciary - checks and 
balances - strong presidency/parliamentary democracy, one party system etc  
• rules for elections - thresholds, proportionality/constituencies etc. 
• Degree of centralization: Relation between Center – Regions - Municipalities 
• Human rights: freedom of press, speech, vote, association 
Possible sources: EIU country profile, Freedom House – country descriptions,  
Indicators: 
World Bank governance index (Kaufman et al, 2006) 
• Voice and accountability: citizens participate in selecting government, freedom of expres-
sion, association, free media 
• Government effectiveness: quality of public services, civil service and its independence 
from political pressures, quality of policy formulation and implementation, and credibility of 
the government’s commitments 
WEF (2007) Global Competitiveness Report, based on expert poll 
• Freedom of press  
• Public trust of politicians 
• Pervasiveness of illegal/legal donations to political parties 
Freedom House:  Freedom in the world indicators, yearly, covering all countries including disputed 
areas, expert poll, point system 0-40 for 7 areas:  
Political Rights  Electoral Process, Political Pluralism and Participation,  
                             Functioning of Government             
Civil Liberties  Freedom of Expression and Belief ; Associational and Organizational Rights;  
Rule of Law, Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (economic institutions?) 
 
Enforcement – rule of law - corruption 
• Rule of law: securing the same conditions for all entities in relation to the law 
• Efficient enforcement of rules through: 
– State bureaucracy with high administrative capacity 
– Independent and qualified judiciary 
• Limiting corruption 
– Bribe of public officials for private gain 
– Capture of the state by private interests 
• covers both political and economic institutions.  
– Can be analyzed both on general and specific level 
– may vary between the different institutions  
Indicators: 
World Bank governance index (Kaufman et al, 2006) (some overlap with political institutions, but 
these are first of all important for the actual enforcement of the economic institutions) 
• Regulatory quality: ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector development    
• Rule of law: confidence in rules, quality of contract enforcement, the police, and courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
• Control of corruption: public power exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests 
WEF (2007) Global Competitiveness Report, based on expert poll 
• Judicial independence, irregular payments in judicial decisions  
• Favoritism in decisions of government officials 
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• Organized crime  
• Business costs of corruption 
World Bank: enterprise surveys –  
• Corruption:  costs % of sales – frequency - bribes for government contract.  
• Courts – confidence – time - resolutions 
Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index, expert poll, www.transparency.org 
 
Economic Institutions  
Property rights protection, ownership structure, privatization, corporate governance 
• protection against appropriation from the state,  
• protection against private entities taking over the rights through illegal means,  
• protection of minority owners 
• protection of creditors, bankruptcy legislation 
• Who are the main owners of the enterprises (state, banks, foreign investors, concentrated 
domestic, diversified, managers, employees),   
• Other rules for good corporate governance, disclosure, auditing, role of board often included 
in company law and some times supplemented by soft law (corporate governance code) 
Indicators: 
EBRD Transition Report (2006) - for 27 transition countries. 
• index of governance and enterprise restructuring (overlaps with economic system) 
• indicators for progress in privatization 
World Bank, doing business: protecting investors 
WEF (2006):  Efficacy of corporate boards/protection of minority shareholders/strength of auditing 
and accounting standards 
Djankov & La Porta et al. 2007, anti director dealing index, aggregate index for quality of share-
holder protection over a variety of indicators. 
 
State regulation versus liberalization - type and degree of state regulation 
• regulation of prices 
• tax systems,  
• barriers to business – licensing – red tape? 
– need and trouble for getting license and other procedures to establish private firms 
• competition rules, free entry? 
• regulation of foreign trade:  
– direct regulation: licenses and quotas, tariffs and taxes 
• exchange rate 
• regulation of capital flows including FDI 
• Labor market regulations, flexibility? 
Indicators: direct measures like:  
• share of regulated prices (in a basket of good e.g. related to the consumer price index) 
• Tariff revenue: % of imports 
• Actual flows:   Openness: Foreign trade, exchange rate, FDI, capital flows 
• Share of foreign trade in GDP = (exports+imports)/GDP     correct for small country bias! 
• Conditions for FDI (UNCTAD) 
World Bank: Doing Business, measures of business regulations and their enforcement across 175 
countries: starting a business, dealing with licenses, employing workers, registering property, get-
ting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, closing 
down a business. (yearly expert poll) www.doingbusiness.org 
World Bank: Enterprise survey. Data on more than 66,000 firms in 98 countries, information on 
firm characteristics, business perceptions, and indicators on the quality of the business environment. 
150 business environment indicators. Every 3 years in each country   www.enterprisesurveys.org 




The structure and stage of development of the financial sector in relation to: 
Banking: Ownership structure, weight and development of banking, indicators: 
• Asset share of state owned and of foreign owned 
• Domestic credit to private sector (%GDP) households/enterprises 
• Non performing loans (NPL) in total loans 
• Interest rate spreads (indicator for competition)  
• EBRD index of banking sector reform 
Stock markets, indicators: 
• Stock market capitalization (%GDP) 
• Stock trading volume in % of capitalization 
• EBRD index of reform of non-bank financial institutions 
Other financial markets, indicators 
• EBRD index of non-banking financial sector 
World Bank, Enterprise survey, enterprises’ sources of finance. 
 
Informal institutions - culture 
Just the fact that it is informal makes it much more difficult to give indicators, and the indicators 
actually given have been much discussed. 
Some description of the importance of religions, ethnic group is relevant (but may overlap with so-
cial groups: 
Some indicators often used are given by Hofstede (1983): 
• Collectivism/individualism 
• Power distance 
• Masculinity/femininity 
• Uncertainty avoidance 




General sources from OECD, World Bank, IMF and EIU country profiles + local statistics   
 
Macro-economic flows: 
Main macro economic variables 
• GDP, GDP-growth rate, GDP/capita, (fixed prices)  
measured in USD or Euro (and PPP with correction for differences in domestic price levels) 
• Savings-, Investment % of GDP,  
Macroeconomic stabilization and economic policy indicators 
• Inflation rate 
• Fiscal policy: budget deficit, public debt 
• External balance, X, M, trade-balance, current account, foreign debt 
• Exchange rate regime, development in exchange rate  
• Monetary conditions, interest rate, 
• Foreign trade, main partners, growth of  exports and imports, (X+M)/GDP.  
• FDI: inflows, outflows, stocks and institutional quality promoting FDI, see  www.unctad.org 
Labor market 
• Employment, unemployment rate 
• Wage per worker, real wage growth 
• Labor productivity 
Other market variables – local statistics on specific industries. 
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Economy - resources 
Human capital 
• Population, size, growth,  
• Dependency ratio:young+old/working age population (15-64 years) 
• Lifetime expectancy,  WEF 
• Education, primary, secondary, tertiary enrollment,  WDI 
• Quality of educational system, WEF 
• Quality of public schools, WEF  
Fixed Capital, structure of production 
• Enterprises structure, small, medium, large/distribution on different sectors 
• Indicators for technological level, patents/R&D in % of GDP/employment in high tech 
• Research and Development /GDP (divided on private and public) 
Geography 
• Endowment of primary commodities, like oil, coal, metals and minerals 
• Agriculture, forestry, fishing,  
• Climate, Coastline, mountains, low lands rivers,  
Infrastructure 
• Overall infrastructure quality WEFs 
• Fixed line/mobile penetration rate 
• Internet penetration rate 
• Etc -  see WDI-online 
• Indicators for quality of roads, railways, harbours etc 
Environmental impact (see eg. WDI-online, WEF, Stern Report) 
 
Industry analysis: Porter’s Diamond for industry competitiveness and Porter’s Five Forces for entry 
 
SURROUNDING WORLD 
Most indicators are given in relation to the PIE-system, but some remaining parts may be separately 
commented in a specific section. 
Politics – relation to other countries, alliances,  
Institutions - role of international organizations. 
Economy – comments on role of different countries and regional groups in relation to trade, cur-
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